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REPLY TO APPELLEE'S ANSWERING BRIEF 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
which are determinative of the issues raised by Appellee WHWC's answering brief. 
However, Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is applicable to the analysis of Tolman's 
reply. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TOLMAN'S OBJECTION TO 
THE THIRD-PARTY ATTORNEY 
FEE INSTRUCTION WAS ADEQUATE 
1. Tolman's Objection Was Sufficient in These Circumstances. 
Tolman's objection to the third-party attorney fees instruction was made during 
counsels' conference with the trial judge at which the instructions were reviewed before 
submission to the jury. The objection is found at T. 799-800, which pages are attached as 
Addendum No. 1. This on-the-record exception to the instruction challenged in this 
appeal is cited at lines 5-6, page 13, of Appellant Tolman's brief. 
In Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital. 830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992), the sole issue on 
appeal was review of the trial court's instruction to the jury. Objections had been made, 
but they "were not textbook examples of specificity." Jd. at 272. The Supreme Court noted 
that of two reasons recognized in Utah case law for requiring objections to jury 
1 
instructions-preservation for appeal and notice to the trial court of the claimed error in the 
instructions-the "primary" reason is notice to the court. Id. Therefore, where an objection 
to a jury instruction calls the trial court's attention to the fact and nature of the instruction's 
flaw, the objection has fulfilled its primary purpose. 
Further, in discussing the sufficiency of the objections made in Nielsen, the 
Supreme Court noted that "the objections could have been better stated if counsel had had 
more time to work on them, but he had to dictate them under the stress and pressure of 
a trial." id. In the instant case, WHWC's proposed instructions served on Friday, August 
27, 1993 included no mention of the third-party attorney fee rule. R. 1125-1221. Trial 
began on Monday, August 30 and continued through Thursday, September 2, 1993. 
Some time on Thursday, WHWC filed a trial brief on several theories for recovery of 
attorney fees, among which was the third-party rule. R. 1301-09. When the chambers 
conference on jury instructions convened at 10:30 A.M. the next day, Instruction No. 15 had 
been submitted. T. 799. The third-party attorney fee theory of recovery had not been 
pleaded in WHWC's amended counterclaim (R. 378-395), and to Appellant Tolman's 
counsel's best knowledge from their review of the record on appeal and of the transcript 
of the trial proceedings, no notice of that claim for relief had been given to Tolman before 
the last day of trial, September 2,1993. Thus, Tolman's counsel had been presented with 
the third-party attorney fee theory for the first time perhaps sixteen hours before the 
conference on the jury instructions and at the close of four full days of trial. Unlike counsel 
in Nielsen, he did not have the luxury of dictating his objection but was required to make 
it orally in chambers. He made the best objection he could and-as set forth below-it was 
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sufficient to alert the trial court to the instruction's errors and, therefore, should preserve 
the issue for appellate review. 
2. Tolman's Objection Apprised the Trial Court that Two of the Three Elements of the 
Third-Party Attorney Fee Rule Were Not Supported by the Facts of the Case. 
The objection made by Tolman's trial counsel was adequate because two of the 
three elements necessary of that theory were not present in this case: First, he objected 
on the basis that the facts of the case did not demonstrate that Tolman had committed a 
breach of any fiduciary duty owed to WHWC by dividing SIDCO's water distribution system 
into thirds. The evidence was not disputed that WHWC accepted the three-way division 
of SIDCO's water distribution system among SIDCO, Eaglebrook and WHWC by entering 
the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement. In addition, WHWC's first elected member-
president, Don Reusch, testified that WHWC considered itself bound by the Water 
Agreement, including the acceptance by the water company initially of only one-third of 
SIDCO's distribution system. T. 327. Later, in 1991, when WHWC entered a separate 
agreement with Walter and SIDCO for SIDCO's development of additional subdivision 
phases in Winchester Hills it again ratified the binding nature of the January 19, 1989 
Water Agreement. EX. P-26. Second, the undisputed evidence before the trial court 
established that either Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff were in privity concerning the 
one-third interest in the water distribution system conveyed by SIDCO to Eaglebrook 
which, in turn, conveyed it to Lava Bluff, or that they were at least so related in their 
relationship under the January 19 and February 25, 1989 contracts that the third-party 
attorney fee rule should not have been recognized as a theory of recovery available to 
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WHWC. Indeed, the trial court had already granted a partial summary judgment motion 
to WHWC declaring that Lava Bluff and Tolman were collaterally estopped from 
challenging an order in a prior lawsuit to the effect that Eaglebrook was bound to SIDCO 
and WHWC under the terms of the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement. Privity in the 
legal sense among Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff-or at least a similarity of interests 
and common control among them sufficient to satisfy the requirements of collateral 
estoppel-had become the law of the case. 
The application of common law by trial courts presents questions of law which are 
reviewable by this Court for correctness. If the evidence before the trial court was not 
subject to substantial dispute, and that evidence established that one of the three elements 
of the cause of action under the third-party attorney fee rule was not established or was 
negated, it was legal error for the trial court to submit that claim to the jury. Tolman's trial 
counsel argued that under the facts, the third-party attorney fee rule had no application. 
For either of the reasons set forth above, he was correct. Therefore, Instruction No. 15 
should not have been given. 
In this case, two of the three elements of the common law theory of recovery under 
the third-party attorney fee rule were negated by the evidence: There was there no breach 
of a duty owed to WHWC by Tolman when SIDCO's water distribution was divided into 
thirds, and under the law of the case Tolman and Lava Bluff had been held collaterally 
estopped from challenging the application of the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement 
against Eaglebrook. So, for purposes of analyzing the third-party attorney fee rule, 
Tolman and Lava Bluff were "connected"-that is, not true third parties to the original 
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claimed breach. At least one of the three elements of the third-party attorney fee cause 
of action—as delineated in Instruction No. 15- was clearly negated. Therefore, it was 
legally erroneous for the trial court to submit Instruction No. 15 to the jury. 
3. The Objection Points to the Trial Court's Plain Error. 
In addition to his timely objection to the third-party attorney fee rule instruction, 
Tolman's trial counsel had moved for a directed verdict on that claim. The basis of the 
motion was essentially the same as he later urged in objecting to Instruction No. 15. T. 
781-793. The trial court denied that motion. 
In Henderson v. Mever. 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975) our Supreme Court held that it 
was plain error for the trial court not to direct a verdict on the issue of liability, even where 
Plaintiff had not made a motion (although she had requested a directed verdict instruction) 
and the facts supported it. In Henderson, a motorist and her passenger were rear-ended 
by another driver. The evidence showed the other driver to have been clearly negligent. 
Notwithstanding her failure to move for a directed verdict, and notwithstanding the fact that 
her passenger neither made a directed-verdict motion nor requested a directed-verdict 
instruction, the Court held that the motorist's request for a directed verdict instruction had 
sufficiently apprised the trial court, and the issue of liability should not have been given to 
the jury. The Supreme Court stated: 
The law is to the effect that one who does not move for a 
directed verdict generally has no standing to urge on appeal 
that the evidence does not support the judgment. However, an 
exception exists where plain error appears in the record and 
it would result in a miscarriage of justice to affirm the judgment, 
[citing Rule 51, U.R.C.P.] 
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533 P.2d 291-92. 
In the present case, Tolman's objection to Instruction No. 15 on the basis that the 
facts and the law did not support submission of a third-party attorney fee claim to the jury 
sufficiently apprised the trial court. Our district courts are held to know the common law 
and to apply it correctly. The court below looked to Washington State pronouncements 
of the common law in drafting the jury instruction on the third-party attorney fee rule. 
Under that state's analysis of the third-party attorney fee rule, the fulcrum upon which the 
rule balances is whether the lawsuit for which the attorney fees are claimed is brought or 
defended by a third person-that is, a person not privy to the contract, agreement or events 
out of which the litigation arises. See Armstrong Construction Company v Thomson. 390 
P.2d 976, 979-80 (Wash. 1964), cited at pp. 13-14 of Appellant Tolman's brief. 
This Court reviews the trial court's application of common law for correctness. It 
was plain error for the trial court to deny Tolman's motion for a directed verdict on the third-
party attorney fee claim. It was also plain error to overrule his later objection to Instruction 
No. 15 because both the facts and the law of the case establish privity, or 
"connectedness," sufficient to negate third-party status between Tolman and Lava Bluff. 
WHWC's suggestion that Tolman's privity argument is defeated by the fact that 
throughout the litigation Tolman treated Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff as entities separate 
and distinct from himself is neither legally nor logically persuasive. In order for privity to 
exist in the law's contemplation-for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel, or for 
a third-party analysis under the third-party attorney fee rule-it is not necessary to 
demonstrate that the persons and entities in question are identical. If they were, the privity 
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analysis would not be necessary in the first place. What is important for Tolman's privity 
analysis-and is shown clearly by the evidence-is that Tolman owned and controlled 
Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff, and that the property rights which were the subject of Lava 
Bluffs claims against WHWC came to Lava Bluff through a succession of contracts and 
conveyances originating with the SIDCO-Walter-Tolman-Eaglebrook separation agreement 
and perpetuating SIDCO's plan for the final development of WHWC as a self-sustaining 
and fully capitalized mutual water company. 
Similarly, WHWC's suggestion that Tolman's argument is, in essence, an alter ego 
position which frustrates public policy and requires that the corporate existence of 
Eaglebrook and/or Lava Bluff be disregarded is fallacious. It is recognized that a privity 
analysis for res judicata purposes does not require a party in a later suit to be the alter ego 
of a party in the earlier suit; rather, it is sufficient if the party in the later action is the 
successor in interest to the first party. CLS Associates. Ltd.. v. A B 762 SW2d. 221, 
224 (Tex. App. Dallas 1988). Although WHWC's Amended Answer asserted the 
affirmative defense that Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff were the alter egos of Tolman (T. 381), 
WHWC neither pursued that claim at trial or requested that instructions related to that 
defense be submitted to the jury. 
The trial court erred. Tolman's objection to Jury Instruction No. 15 was sufficient 
to alert the trial court to its error. Therefore, this Court should set aside the award of 
attorney fees against Tolman. 
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POINT II 
UNDER UTAH LAW, THE PRESENT 
CIRCUMSTANCE CALLS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
OF JURY INSTRUCTION 15 
WHWC relies on Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) 
for its position that this Court may not review the jury instructions because "special 
circumstances" are not shown. See: Appellee WHWC's answering brief, pp. 22-23. The 
reason the Crookston court did not review the jury instruction of the trial court in that case 
is that no objection was raised at trial. 817 P.2d at 799.1 As detailed in Point I above, 
in the instant case a timely and sufficient objection was made at trial. 
Rule 51, Utah R. Civ. P., states: "Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement 
[that objection be made to a jury instruction, the appellate court, in its discretion, and in the 
interests of justice, may review the giving or failure to give an instruction." Therefore, even 
if no objection had been made at trial, or if the objection were found to have been less than 
distinct, this Court could make discretionary review of Instruction No. 15. 
1. Discretionary Review is Appropriate Where Jury Instruction is Confusing. 
As detailed above, the sole issue on appeal in Neilsen v. Pioneer Vallev Hospital. 
830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992) was review of the trial court's jury instructions because they 
were confusing and contradictory. There, the Supreme Court noted that the objections 
1
 WHWC's brief quotes Crookston but does not explore the case law it cites. Hansen v. 
Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) explains that the reason for requiring objections is to inform the appellate 
court of the grounds on which a jury instruction is being challenged. In Hansen, the record "does not 
indicate that an objection was made to the instructions actually given." Jd at 16. Previous to Hansen, both 
Williams v. Llovd. 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166,167 (Utah 1965) and McCall v. Kendrick. 2 Utah 2d. 365, 
274 P.2d 962, 963 (Utah 1954) assert the requirement of showing "special circumstances" requiring review 
of jury instructions where no objection was made. 
8 
presented were "not textbook examples of specificity" and were not made within the timing 
parameters required by Rule 51. Id. at 272. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court exercised 
its discretionary authority to review the instructions, found them to have been confusing 
and contradictory, and on that basis reversed the decision of the trial court. 
Following Nielsen, in Bradv v. Gibb. 886 P.2d 104 (Utah App. 1994), this Court 
found that "[t]he trial court erred by giving contradictory and potentially confusing jury 
instructions," and on that basis reversed the decision of the trial court without any 
reference to the sufficiency of-or even the existence of-any objection to the jury 
instructions at trial. In the instant case, as in Brady and Nielsen, the submission of 
contradictory and potentially confusing instructions to the jury was error and calls for 
appellate review regardless of the quality of objection to the instruction at trial. 
2. In This Case the Jury Instruction on the Third-Party Attorney Fee Rule Confused 
the Jury. 
In Badger v. Clavson. 18 Utah 2d 329, 332, 422 P.2d. 665, 666-67 (1967), the 
Supreme Court said: 
[a jury] instruction should be considered in its entirety, and 
along with all of the other instructions given, to determine 
whether they accomplished what was essential: explaining to 
the jury in a manner understandable to them the issues of fact 
and the law applicable thereto . . . . 
The Nielsen court also noted that "jury instructions are to be read as a whole," and 
considered the relationship among relevant instructions as well as the content of each. 830 
P.2d at 274. 
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In the present case, Tolman objected at trial to Instructions No. 13, 14, 15 and 16, 
all of which refer to fiduciary duty. T. 799-800. Instructions No. 15 and 16-specifically 
regarding the application of the third-party attorney fee rule-also require a determination 
by the jury as to whether the parties were "not connected," meaning "not in privity" under 
the third-party attorney fee rule as adopted in Utah under South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack. 765 
P.2d 1279,1282 (Utah App. 1988) citing from the Washington state pronouncement of the 
rule in Morgan v. Roller. 794 P.2d 1313, 1315 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). See Appellant 
Tolman's brief at pp. 12-14. 
As detailed in Appellant Tolman's brief at pages 20-24, Instructions No. 13 through 
16 failed to differentiate between the defined fiduciary relationship and the undefined 
"connectedness" concept presented in Instructions No. 15 and 16. The jury was confused 
by this, requested clarification of it, and still committed error in applying the "connected" 
concept. This Court will recall that the jury sent a question to the trial court stating that it 
was having difficulty understanding the "not connected" element of Instruction No. 16 
pertaining to the third-party attorney fee rule in the situation involving Tolman's deed of 
125 acre feet of WHWC water to his wife and himself. After receiving the best additional 
instruction the trial court was able to give, the jury returned a verdict against Tolman, 
having found that he and his wife were "not connected." Thereafter, at the bench trial on 
the issue of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, the trial court realized that under 
the law and the terms of the deed by which the 125 acre feet of water had been conveyed, 
Tolman and his wife had to be considered legally "connected." Therefore, an essential 
element of the cause of action for an award of third party-attorney fees was negated, and 
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on that basis the trial court sua sponte set aside the jury's verdict against Tolman for an 
award of attorney fees related to his conveyance of WHWC's 125 acre feet of water. 
The jury made their finding on Instruction No. 15 based on precisely the same 
confusing information as they applied in their finding on Instruction 16, and in doing so 
they made the same prejudicial error. The trial court should have set aside the attorney 
fee award based on Tollman's "connection" with Lava Bluff just as it did based on Tolman's 
"connection" with his wife. The factual and legal privity between Tolman and Lava Bluff 
was clearly established by the facts and under the law of the case (by order of the trial 
court granting WHWC's motion for partial summary judgment earlier in the proceedings), 
but the jury did not understand the concept-as evidenced both by their question on the 
wording by which it was presented in Instruction No. 16 and by their error in applying that 
wording.2 
Under Nielsen and Brady, supra, where "the potential for confusion" of the jury by 
the instruction given them is "substantial" (Nielsen at 275) or "high" (Brady at 107), review 
of the instruction is appropriate, and reversal of error caused by that confusion is called 
for. In the instant case, the confusion of the jury was not just "potential." As the record 
shows, the jury in this case was ID fact confused. Review of the confusing instruction and 
of the error it caused is appropriate and necessary. 
The trial court's failure to correct the jury's misconception as to Instruction No. 15~as it did 
as to Instruction No. 16—is plain error, mandating reversal on appeal. 
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3. Jury Instruction No. 15 Was Self-Contradictory. 
In addition to its inconsistency with the other instructions on fiduciary responsibility 
and the third-party attorney fee rule, Instruction No. 15 presented the jury with the task of 
making three findings which were logically incompatible with one another under the facts 
of this case. See Appellant Tolman's brief, p. 24. WHWC makes much of defending the 
internal consistency of "Subpart (2)" of Instruction No. 15 (pages 28-30 of WHWC's 
answering brief), urging a general, rather than specific, finding of foreseeability in 
negligence analysis as the proper basis for interpreting "Subpart (2)" of the Instruction. 
The analogy fails, because "litigation generally" is foreseeable from every possible breach 
of any duty, and the foreseeable litigation contemplated by the third-party attorney fee rule 
is much more specific to the issues of the breach in question. Further, Tolman's position 
is not, as WHWC argues, that "subpart (2)M is internally inconsistent. Rather, Tolman 
points out that no logical reasoning can reconcile all of the three subparts of Instruction 
No. 15. 
4. Instruction No. 15 So Confused the Jury as to Result in Prejudicial Error. 
Tolman has demonstrated the illogic within Instruction No. 15 and the confusion of 
the jury as to its "not connected" requirement. The jury in this case was not only likely to 
be confused by this instruction, they were in fact confused by it. Had they properly 
understood the concept of "connectedness" as privity of legal interest and as distinct from 
fiduciary responsibility, they would have reached a different conclusion. Under Brady and 
Nielsen, supra, the instruction should therefore be reviewed by this Court and the error 
flowing from the instruction should be reversed. 
12 
CONCLUSION IN REPLY 
WHWC presented the third-party attorney fee theory of recovery literally at the last 
hour. The facts and evidence in this case simply do not support application of that theory, 
and Tolman's trial counsel did not have adequate opportunity to detail the numerous ways 
in which Instruction 15 was improper. Nevertheless, objection to the instruction was made, 
and the objection was sufficient to notify the court that the facts and evidence of the case 
were incongruent with the elements of the third-party attorney fee rule. The trial court's 
failure to correct the instruction was plain error. 
In addition, Instruction 15 was confusing-inherently, and in the context of the case 
and the other instructions on the third-party attorney fee rule. Utah's appellate courts 
review jury instructions where, as here, they are confusing and clarification would have 
produced a different jury finding. The trial court's error in failing to correct the jury 
instruction, as it was apprised by Tolman was prejudicial. It must now be reviewed and 
corrected by this Court. 
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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S CROSS-APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the cross-appeal pursuant to U.C.A. 
§78-2(a)-3(2)(k) (Sup. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF CROSS-APPEAL ISSUES 
Cross-Appellees Tolman and Eaglebrook disagree that U 1 of Cross-Appellant 
Winchester Hills Water Company's ("WHWC") statement of cross-appeal issues correctly 
states that issue on appeal. At the close of the trial WHWC took the position that Tolman 
was liable to it for 25 acre feet of water, not Eaglebrook. The directed verdict against 
WHWC was made, and argued, with respect to Tolman, not Eaglebrook. Therefore, 
WHWC's statement of its first issue on appeal is inaccurate. Cross-Appellees Tolman and 
Eaglebrook address this issue in Point I of this responding brief, below. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
which are determinative of the issues appealed by Cross-Appellant WHWC. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Cross-Appellant WHWC, at page 2 of its answering brief, agrees that Appellant 
Tolman's brief correctly sets forth the nature of the case, the court proceedings and the 
disposition of the case. Tolman's brief states, at page 4: "WHWC cross-appeals from the 
trial court's ruling that Tolman was not obligated to provide 25 acre feet of water to 
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WHWC, . . . ." This comports with WHWC's Notice of Appeal which states that the 
appeal was taken from paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the final Judgment entered on October 
5, 1993, wherein U 5 is recited as follows: 
5. WHWC's claims against Counterclaim Defendant 
R.C. Tolman for 25 acre feet of water or any shortfall in water 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Cross-Appellees' Statement of Facts in Response to Cross Appellant WHWC's 
Statement of Facts. 
Cross-Appellees Tolman and Eaglebrook make this responding statement of facts 
to correct certain inaccurate assertions and inferences in Cross-Appellant WHWC's 
statement of relevant facts which begins at page 2 of WHWC's brief: 
As part of SIDCO's sale of Winchester Hills Subdivision lots, it entered into a water 
user agreement with each lot purchaser through its controlled water company, WHWC, 
which entitled the lot owner to receive water service through WHWC. T. 134,138-39, 309, 
517-18, 525. SIDCO's intent was to have each purchaser of a lot also own an interest in 
WHWC. T. 217-18. SIDCO's responsibility under the water user agreements was to 
ensure that 1.12 acre feet of water, that is, 1,000 gallons per day, was available for each 
lot purchased in Phases I and II. T. 223. As of the end of 1988, no lot purchasers had 
been issued WHWC water stock certificates (T. 221), and SIDCO retained all WHWC 
voting stock under its control. T. 134, 138-39. In performance of the water user 
agreements with lot owners, SIDCO had deeded water rights to WHWC as needed in the 
course of selling those lots prior to the December 31, 1988, separation between Walter 
and Tolman. T. 145, 281-82. 
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Under the February 25,1989 settlement agreement which was effective December 
31,1988, each lot owner in Phases I and II was to be issued one share of WHWC culinary 
water stock. Ex. P-15,1[8. In furtherance of that agreement, SIDCO and WHWC entered 
the January 19,1989 Water Agreement which provided that the Phase I and II lot owners 
would be issued a share of WHWC water stock in exchange for their water user 
agreements. Ex. P-18, If 6. WHWC's Articles of Incorporation provided that its members' 
water shares are appurtenant to their purchased lots, and that those shares are to be 
issued only pursuant to, and in association with, the purchase of a lot. Ex. P-4, Art. X-XII. 
WHWC's articles and by-laws made all culinary water stock assessable. Ex. P-4, Art. XI; 
Ex. D-58, Art. X. Hook-up fees and assessments for WHWC water service were charged 
to the lot purchasers in addition to the purchase price paid to SIDCO for the lot and water 
share. Ex. P-4, Art. XI. 
The February 25, 1989 settlement agreement also provided that one share of 
WHWC water stock was to be issued to both SIDCO and Eaglebrook for each unsold lot 
in Phases I and II which SIDCO and Eaglebrook would own after December 31, 1988. Ex. 
P-15,1f 8. However, unlike the WHWC stock issued to lot owners which was assessable, 
the stock which was to be issued to "SIDCO and/or its assignee [Eaglebrook]" under the 
January 19,1989 Water Agreement for those unsold lots was not to be subject to regular 
assessments. Rather, those shares for the unsold lots would only be subject to stand-by 
assessments of $1 per month per lot 
until such time as SIDCO and/or its assignee sells said lot(s) 
to a bona-fide purchaser for value or connects said lot(s) to 
the water distribution system, whichever occurs first. In the 
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event SIDCO and/or its assignee connects said lot to the water 
distribution system, SIDCO and/or its assignee shall pay the 
customary connection fee and other assessments regularly 
assessed by WHWC. Otherwise, SIDCO and/or its assignees 
shall not be obligated to pay connection fees or assessments 
other than as set forth herein. 
Ex. P-18,1f2. 
As of December 31, 1988, a total of 211 lots had been developed in Phases I and 
II of Winchester Hills Subdivision. However, only about 160 of those lots had been sold 
to purchasers. T. 218-19. Of the 51 developed lots which remained unsold, 28 were 
transferred to Eaglebrook by the terms of the February 25, 1989 settlement agreement. 
T. 577; Ex. P-15, U a(1). The other 23 unsold lots remained in SIDCO's inventory. Tolman 
testified that 179 acre feet of water was needed to provide 1,000 gallons per day to the lots 
in Phases I and II which SIDCO had been sold as of December 31,1988, and that WHWC 
owned more than 179 acre feet of water at that time. T. 577-78. So, WHWC had more 
than sufficient water rights to supply the Phase I and II lot owners as of December 31, 
1988. T. 579. Tolman agreed that more water rights would have to be transferred to 
WHWC in order for it to furnish water service to the remaining 51 lots in Phases I and II 
when they were sold after 1988 (T. 504-06), but that as of December 31, 1988, there was 
no obligation for SIDCO to provide water through WHWC for those unsold lots. T. 580-81. 
Tolman testified, accordingly, that no water shortfall existed in WHWC as of December 31, 
1988, which was the cut-off date for SIDCO obligations which Eaglebrook was to share 
under the February 25, 1989 settlement agreement. T. 533. The 205 acre feet of water 
available for WHWC's use in Phases I and II on December 31, 1988, was more than 
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adequate to provide water service to each lot owner who had purchased a lot from SIDCO 
up to that date. T. 238. 
Walter, the controlling owner of SIDCO and president of WHWC who signed the 
January 19, 1989 Water Agreement for SIDCO and WHWC, testified that WHWC's 
acknowledgment regarding its 235 acre feet of water right was based on his belief that that 
amount was sufficient to provide culinary water service for all lots in Phases I and II, but 
was in error. T. 168, 231, 272. The newly-elected WHWC officers discovered that error 
in May 1989 and tried to negotiate with SIDCO and Eaglebrook. T. 359. The moratorium 
on water hook-ups was put in place after WHWC's officers learned that in April 1989 
Tolman had deeded 125 acre feet of the 235 acre feet of water right recited in the January 
19, 1989 Water Agreement to his wife and himself. T. 579. In February 1990, after the 
125 acre feet came back to WHWC as a result of the litigation with Tolman, WHWC 
started selling water hook-ups in Phases I and II again. T. 376. There is no testimony that 
additional water was conveyed into WHWC after May 1989, and before February 1990, 
to add to the 235 acre feet recited in the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement. Walter's 
company, SIDCO, did not convey the additional 25 acre feet of water to WHWC-which 
Walter and WHWC asserted at trial was SIDCO's share of the claimed 50 acre feet water 
shortfall needed for Phases I and II—until July 1991 in connection with a new agreement 
among WHWC, SIDCO and Walter for SIDCO's development of additional lots in entirely 
new phases of the Winchester Hills Subdivision area. Ex. P-26. T. 385. Such additional 
development was contemplated under If 4 of the January 19,1989 Water Agreement which 
required the developer (either SIDCO or Eaglebrook) to convey the water rights which 
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would be needed by WHWC to provide culinary water service to the additional lots sold. 
T. 277, 345 and 385. 
Tolman's affirmative response to WHWC's counsel's questions at trial regarding 
"his" obligations under the February 25, 1989 settlement agreement for one-half of 
SIDCO's liabilities through December 31, 1988 were made in his capacity as the 
controlling owner of Eaglebrook. T. 532, 538-39. Eaglebrook was the entity which bound 
itself to that performance under the February 25th agreement; Tolman had not done so in 
his individual capacity. Ex. P-15, If 1b(5); T. 532. The entirety of Tolman's trial testimony, 
and the context of these particular questions and answers, make this fact clear. The only 
personal obligations Tolman assumed under the February 25, 1989 settlement agreement 
were specific indemnity and hold harmless agreements. Ex. P-18, Iffl 3 and 6. No such 
indemnification or hold harmless claims are the subject matter of this lawsuit. 
WHWC's statement of facts also erroneously recites that in an earlier lawsuit 
Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff "each stipulated that they were bound by the terms of 
the January 19, 1989, agreement." The written stipulation in question shows that it was 
agreed only that SIDCO and Eaglebrook were bound by the January 1989 Water 
Agreement. Ex. D-59, fl 10. The order entered by the Fifth District Court pursuant to that 
stipulation provided likewise: that the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement with WHWC 
bound and benefitted SIDCO and Eaglebrook. Neither the stipulation nor the order bound 
Tolman to perform the Water Agreement. R. 1597-98. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Cross-Appellees Tolman and Eaglebrook contend that WHWC's cross-appeal claim 
against Eaglebrook for 125 acre feet of water has been waived. At the conclusion of the 
trial during argument on Cross-Appellees' directed verdict motions, WHWC stated that its 
claim for 125 acre feet of water was made against Tolman, not Eaglebrook. In WHWC's 
Notice of Appeal it designated the provisions in the trial court's order that dismissed the 
claim against Tolman for 25 acre feet of water as the order from which appeal was taken. 
Now, in WHWC's cross-appeal brief it attempts to assert the claim for 25 acre feet of water 
against Eaglebrook. It does this by confusing the distinction between Tolman, as the 
owner of Eaglebrook, and Eaglebrook as a distinct corporate entity. Tolman and 
Eaglebrook contend the waiver of any claim against Eaglebrook was clear, and the attempt 
to assert such a claim on this appeal is not timely. 
Cross-Appellee Tolman contends that the trial court's ruling in his favor directing 
a verdict against WHWC on its claim against him for 25 acre of water was legally correct 
under the unambiguous terms of the written contracts in question. If SIDCO had any 
obligation to furnish water rights to WHWC as of December 31st, 1988, it was 
Eaglebrook's obligation to share in the performance of that SIDCO obligation under the 
February 25, 1989 agreement, and not Tolman's. Tolman's sole obligation, personally, 
under the February 25th settlement agreement which could in any way relate to WHWC's 
claim was his agreement to indemnify and hold harmless SIDCO from obligations which 
existed as of December 31st, 1988. No claim is made by WHWC against SIDCO in this 
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action, and no indemnity or hold harmless agreement of the kind enforceable under the 
February 25, 1989 settlement agreement is pleaded. 
Lastly, Cross-Appellees Tolman and Eaglebrook contend the undisputed evidence 
and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom clearly show that SIDCO did not owe 
WHWC any water rights as of December 31,1988, to cure any alleged "shortfall" of water 
rights required to service Phase I and II lot owners. 
ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE 
TO CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURTS DIRECTED VERDICT 
AGAINST WHWC ON ITS CLAIM FOR 
25 ACRE FEET OF WATER WAS CORRECT 
1. WHWC Waived Anv Claim Against Eaalebrook for 25 Acre Feet of Water. 
At the close of all the evidence, Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff made a directed 
verdict motion against WHWC on the issues which are the subject of this appeal, namely, 
for the conveyance to WHWC of the one-third interest in the water distribution system held 
by Lava Bluff, for delivery of 25 acre feet of water to WHWC and for an award of attorney 
fees. In the course of his response to those motions, WHWC's counsel stated: 
The testimony is clear that as of the 31st of December, there 
was a 50 acre shortfall. We claim that pursuant to the 
February 25th, 1989 agreement, that Mr. Tolman became 
liable for half of the liabilities of SIDCO. It's our position that 
that water shortage was a liability as of December 31st of 
1988, and we would ask it pursuant - we would seek 25 acre 
feet pursuant to that. 
T. 788. 
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The trial court ruled against WHWC on the 25 acre feet of water issue and granted 
the directed verdict motion in favor of Tolman. In the Judgment entered on October 5, 
1993, from which WHWC appeals, the court ordered at paragraph 5 as follows: 
5. WHWC's claims against Counterclaim Defendant R.C. 
Tolman for 25 acre feet of water or any shortfall in water are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
T. 1361; Addendum 2 to Appellant Tolman's brief. 
Consistent with WHWC's announced position stated during argument on the 
directed verdict motions which is quoted above, the prefatory language in the Judgment 
drafted by WHWC's counsel recited, at page 4, that "WHWC further sought delivery of 25 
acre feet of water from R. C. Tolman pursuant to the terms of the February 25, 1989 
Agreement." T. 1357. In the trial court's findings and conclusions it makes apparent the 
basis for its ruling against WHWC on the 25 acre feet of water issue. 
Findings, paragraph 5: 
5. WHWC agreed to be bound by the January 19, 1989 
[Water] Agreement. Pursuant to the January 19, 1989 
Agreement, WHWC agreed that it owned sufficient water to 
service Phases I and II in the Winchester Hills area. 
Conclusions, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6: 
4. As of December 31,1988, there was no water shortfall 
owed to WHWC by any of the plaintiffs. 
5. Pursuant to the January 19, 1989 [Water] Agreement, 
WHWC is bound by the statement therein that there is 
sufficient water to service Phases I and II. 
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6. While WHWC may have a claim against SIDCO for 
additional water rights, the Court concludes that R.C. Tolman 
has no contractual liability to provide 25 acre feet of water to 
WHWC. 
T. 1359-60; Addendum 2 to Appellant Tolman's brief. 
WHWC's Notice of Appeal states that appeal was taken only from paragraphs 3, 
4 and 5 of the Judgment entered on October 5, 1993. Significantly, WHWC's Notice of 
Appeal does not include specification of any error by the trial court in refusing to make a 
judgment or award against Eaglebrook for delivery of 25 acre feet of water. Accordingly, 
any claims of this nature by WHWC against Eaglebrook have been waived. 
WHWC's Docketing Statement attempts, apparently, to raise a claim against 
Eaglebrook by expanding the statement of the issue against Tolman in its Notice of Appeal 
to include sub-issues against Eaglebrook which challenge the propriety of the trial courts 
directed verdict against it on the 25 acre feet issue by suggesting the evidence was 
sufficient to establish a viable jury question as to Eaglebrook's liability. See: Docketing 
Statement, pages 6-8. WHWC narrows this focus on Eaglebrook in Point I of its cross-
appeal argument by limiting the description of the issues on appeal as being centered in 
the trial court's directed verdict ruling against WHWC on a claim that Eaglebrook was 
liable for the 25 acre feet of water. In light of WHWC's unequivocal representation to the 
trial court that its claim for 25 acre feet of water was against Tolman, the argument now 
presented against Eaglebrook for this relief is legally barred because any such claim was 
waived at trial, and it is not to be considered as it is now first raised on appeal. 
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The phrasing of WHWC's cross-appeal argument against Eaglebrook contradicts 
its clear statements both to the trial court and in its Notice of Appeal by repeatedly 
referring to a claim against "Tolman, through Eaglebrook." The distinction between 
Tolman, an individual, and Eaglebrook, the corporation, cannot be disregarded so easily. 
WHWC pleaded in the Sixth Defense of its Amended Answer that Eaglebrook Corporation 
was the alter ego of Tolman. T. 381. However, at trial WHWC presented no evidence as 
to that issue, and the jury instructions submitted by WHWC prior to trial contained nothing 
addressed to that issue. T. 1185-1221. Accordingly, the alter ego claim was abandoned. 
For these reasons, WHWC's attempt to disregard the legal and factual distinction between 
Tolman and Eaglebrook, and to assert a claim of Eaglebrook's liability for the 25 acre feet 
at this time is disingenuous. 
2. Tolman Was Not Contractually Responsible for Any Obligation SIDCO May Have 
Had to Provide Any Water to WHWC as of December 31. 1988. 
With regard to the issue of who was obligated to provide water rights to WHWC in 
order for it to service Winchester Hills Subdivision lot owners the facts regarding SIDCO's 
conveyance of water rights to WHWC as Winchester Hills lots were developed and the 
terms of the January 19 and February 25, 1989 written agreements are undisputed and 
unambiguous. It was on this basis that the trial court granted the directed verdict motion 
in favor of Tolman and against WHWC, and the court was legally correct and factually 
justified in doing so. 
Prior to the December 1988 business separation between Walters and Tolman, it 
was SIDCO who sold developed lots and entered into the water user agreements through 
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its controlled water company, WHWC, with the lot purchasers. It was SIDCO who 
transferred water rights to WHWC on an as-needed basis to enable the water company 
to provide culinary water service to the lot owners. Therefore, as of December 31, 1988, 
SIDCO was the sole entity obligated to provide water to WHWC for the benefit of its 
subdivision lot purchasers. Toiman and Walters had arrived at their settlement agreement 
as of the end of 1988 (T. 154), and Toiman had resigned as an officer and director of 
SIDCO effective December 31, 1988. Ex. P-13. In furtherance of that understanding, 
Walters entered the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement on behalf of both SIDCO and 
WHWC. Ex. P-18. Toiman was not a party to the Water Agreement, and the reference 
to "SIDCO and/or its assignee" in that agreement was determined in subsequent litigation 
to mean "SIDCO and/or Eaglebrook." Ex. D-59; T. 1597-98. It was in that Water 
Agreement of January 19th that Walter, acting as owner of SIDCO and president of 
WHWC, first referred to the water requirements for Phases I and II and attempted to 
quantify them by acknowledging that the existing 235 acre feet of water rights WHWC 
owned was sufficient to service of the Phase I and II lots, both sold and unsold. The 
drafting and execution of the January 19th Water Agreement took place without Tolman's 
participation or approval, and occurred 19 days after the December 31, 1988 effective date 
of his separation agreement with Walter. When the separation agreement was finalized 
on February 28, 1989, Eaglebrook agreed that one-half of SIDCO's obligations "through 
December 31, 1988" could be transferred to it. WHWC contends that the claimed 
"shortfall" in its water rights for Phases I and II as of December 1988 is one of those "other 
SIDCO liabilities." Even so, the only obligation Toiman assumed, personally, under the 
25 
February 25, 1989 Agreement which could conceivably have any relation at all to 
WHWC'S claim for the water shortfall is the provision of paragraph 3 of that agreement 
which provides that Tolman would indemnify and hold SIDCO harmless for one-half of any 
claim brought against SIDCO for an obligation incurred through December 31, 1988. 
SIDCO is not a party to this action, and no indemnity or hold harmless claim has been 
made against Tolman by that company. 
The trial court directed a verdict against WHWC on the basis of these unambiguous 
contract terms and the undisputed evidence that it was SIDCO's obligation to see that 
water was transferred to WHWC to supply the needs of its lot purchasers under the water 
user agreements. In ruling, Judge Eves stated: 
That responsibility [to make sure that WHWC had adequate 
water for its residents] under all the agreements, falls squarely 
on the shoulders of SIDCO. They are the ones who agreed to 
provide the water; they are the ones who should be held 
responsible. . . . His [Tolman's] responsibility under the 
February agreement was half of the liabilities of SIDCO [via 
indemnification] up to December 31st, 1988. The liability for 
providing 235 acre feet of water to Winchester Hills Water 
Company did not even arise until 19 days later. So, the 
Motion for Summary Judgment [directed verdict] as to the 
question of the 25 acre feet of water is granted. 
T. 793-95. 
The trial court's findings and conclusions, cited in sub-paragraph 1 of this Point I, 
above, were consistent with this ruling and are helpful to this Court in reviewing the 
correctness of the trial court's disposition of the directed verdict motion. There is no 
dispute that the agreements to provide water rights to WHWC for the use of SIDCO's lot 
purchasers were made by SIDCO, the corporation, and not by its shareholder-owners, 
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Walter and Tolman. Whether a contract exists, and its terms, are questions of law 
reversible for correctness. Whether the trial court properly interpreted the terms of the 
January 19th Water Agreement and the February 25th settlement agreement is also a 
question of law. Cross-Appellees Tolman and Eaglebrook suggest the undisputed facts 
and unambiguous contract terms support the trial court's conclusion that as of the end of 
1988 there was no water shortfall owed to WHWC by any of the plaintiffs and that Tolman, 
specifically, has no contractual liability whatever to provide 25 acre feet of water to 
WHWC. 
3. SIDCO Was Not Obligated to Provide WHWC an Additional 50 Acre Feet of Water 
Rights as of December 31. 1988. 
The evidence was clear that SIDCO transferred water rights to WHWC as required 
in the course of developing lots to insure that the lot purchasers could receive 1,000 
gallons per day of culinary water under their water user agreements. As of the end of 
1988, 211 lots had been developed in Phases I and II, but only 160 had been sold to lot 
owners. The 205 acre feet of WHWC's water rights available out of the total 235 it owned 
was sufficient to supply the 1,000 gallons per day requirement for those 160 lot owners. 
Tolman's testimony that 179 acre feet of water would be sufficient to supply the agreed 
culinary water to those lot owners was not rebutted. There was no evidence that other lots 
had been sold in Phases I or II for which demands had been made on WHWC for water 
service which could not be met by WHWC. 
The significance of the foregoing recital is this: In the February 25, 1989 separation 
agreement it was provided, at j[ 8, that WHWC would issue one share of culinary water 
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stock to each lot owner in Phases I and II, and also issue one share of water stock to 
SIDCO and one share to Eaglebrook for each of the unsold lots and that additional shares 
of water stock would be issued to SIDCO and Eaglebrook for further Winchester Hills 
Subdivision lots if any excess WHWC water rights remaining after the shares for the 
Phase I and II lots-both sold and unsold-had been issued and, after any excess water 
was expended, the developers would convey more water to WHWC. The conclusion to 
be drawn from this contractual arrangement confirms what the evidence otherwise showed 
SIDCO's obligation to have been with regard to transferring water rights to WHWC prior 
to that agreement: water rights were transferred to WHWC by SIDCO as lots were sold 
and the need arose to provide water service to the lot owners. 
The fact that unsold developed lots and lots which were owned by third-party 
purchasers were treated differently with respect to WHWC's need for owning water rights 
was also confirmed by terms of the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement related to the 
assessments. Under WHWC's articles and by-laws, lot owners who were entitled to a 
share of culinary water stock were obligated to pay assessments in addition to the 
purchase price for the lot (which included a water user agreement) and a hook-up fee. 
Under the January 19th Water Agreement, SIDCO and Eaglebrook were not obligated to 
pay assessments on the water stock that would be issued to them for each of the unsold 
Phase I and II lots distributed under the February 25th settlement agreement until each lot 
was sold to a bona fide purchaser or until SIDCO or Eaglebrook connected the lot to 
WHWC's system. Until either of those events occurred, SIDCO and Eaglebrook were 
obligated to pay only a stand-by assessment of $1 per month per lot. This confirms, again, 
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the basic arrangement regarding SIDCO's obligation to provide water rights to WHWC, 
that is, water rights were transferred to the water company as lots were sold and the need 
to provide water service to a lot owner arose. Until that occurred, SIDCO was not 
obligated to transfer water rights to WHWC because WHWC was not obligated to provide 
culinary water service to a lot owner. 
The newly elected officers of WHWC discovered shortly after taking office in May 
1989 that the 235 acre feet of water recited in the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement 
would not be sufficient to eventually service all the lots in Phases I and II, and they began 
negotiating with SIDCO and Eaglebrook regarding Walter's calculation error. They also 
soon learned that Tolman had deeded 125 of those 235 acre feet to his wife and himself 
for the purpose, as Tolman testified, of forcing SIDCO to transfer the agreed one-third 
share of its water distribution system to WHWC in compliance with the February 25, 1989 
settlement agreement. With that 125 acre feet no longer titled in WHWC-although it was 
always available for WHWC's use for its lot owners-the water company's officers imposed 
a moratorium on water hook-ups. Because they could not settle the issue with Tolman 
they sued and, in February 1990, recovered the 125 acre feet. At that time WHWC again 
began selling water hook-ups in Phases I and II to lot purchasers. There is no evidence 
that any additional water rights were transferred to WHWC by SIDCO between the dates 
of the January 19 and February 1989 agreements and the return from Tolman of the 125 
acre feet of water, and it is not disputed that SIDCO did not transfer the 25 acre feet of 
water which it claimed was its share of the December 1988 "shortfall" until it entered the 
separate agreement with WHWC in July 1991 to develop additional lots in new phases of 
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new phases of the Winchester Hills Subdivision area. The reasonable conclusion to be 
drawn from this evidence is that WHWC had more than sufficient water rights to service 
its existing lot owners in Phases I and II as of the end of December 1988, and, therefore, 
there was no water shortfall at that time. This is so because with no additional conveyance 
of water rights to WHWC by SIDCO to augment the 205 acre feet of water which was 
available for service to lot owners as of December 1988, WHWC began issuing more 
water hook-ups to lot owners in Phases I and II in February 1990, as soon as the 125 acre 
feet of water-which was part of the 205 acre feet of water owned by WHWC at the end of 
December 1988-had been reacquired. 
This evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, viewed in a 
light most favorable to WHWC, compels the conclusion that no shortfall of water rights in 
WHWC existed as of December 31, 1988, which SIDCO was obligated to provide. It was 
established, and Tolman did not dispute, that at least 255 acre feet of water would be 
required to provide culinary water service for all of the 211 lots in Phases I and II. 
However, as of the end of December 1988, all of those lots had not been sold, and SIDCO 
had no obligation to provide WHWC with water rights beyond what was needed to provide 
culinary water service to the existing 160 lot owners. SIDCO had no obligation to provide 
WHWC water rights for which there was no contractual demand by lot owners. 
The fact that the January 19 and February 25, 1989 agreements contained 
provisions contemplating issuance of culinary water stock to SIDCO and Eaglebrook out 
of WHWC's excess water rights until such time as those excess water rights were 
exhausted and the developers' obligation to provide more water arose, and the fact that 
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shares of water stock issued to SIDCO and Eaglebrook for unsold subdivision lots would 
not be charged regular assessments until sold to a third-party or connected to the WHWC 
system by the developer, and the fact that WHWC would again begin selling water hook-
ups to lot purchasers in Phases I and II in February 1990 after recovering the 125 acre feet 
from Tolman without any other water rights being transferred to it by SIDCO then existed 
as of December 31,1988, satisfy the requirement of the legal sufficiency of the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, supporting the trial court's grant 
of the directed verdict against WHWC on its claim for recovery of 25 acre feet of water. 
The plain fact is there was no shortfall of water to WHWC as of the end of December 1988 
which made it impossible for WHWC to supply its lot owners. Accordingly, there was no 
obligation on the part of SIDCO to transfer any additional water rights to WHWC at that 
time. 
The trial court found that no water shortfall existed as of December 31 st, 1988, for 
which any of the plaintiffs was obligated. The trial court also found that Tolman was not 
contractually obligated to share SIDCO's obligations, if any, to WHWC for any water 
shortfall as of December 31, 1988. In ruling on the directed verdict motions, the trial court 
below did not sit as a trier of fact. However, these findings make apparent the basis for 
the court's ruling, and they direct this Court to the evidence and inferences therefrom 
which are to be looked to in determining the correctness of the directed verdict ruling. This 
Court likewise, should also be persuaded by that evidence that a directed verdict ruling 
against WHWC on the 25 acre feet of water claimed was proper. 
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POINT II 
THE TERMS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST IMPOSED ON EAGLEBROOK 
WERE NOT AN ABUSE OF 
EQUITABLE DISCRETION. 
In constructive trust and resulting trust cases, the trial court can be called upon to 
alter a deed or other writing in order to effectuate an equitable result between the parties 
or to carry out their intent under the circumstances. Matter of Estate of Hock. 655 P. 2d 
1111 (Utah 1982). In this case, the court below did this by ordering Lava Bluff to return 
to Eaglebrook the title it held to the one-third of SIDCO's water distribution system which 
had been conveyed to Eaglebrook for the purposes contemplated by the January 19, 1989 
Water Agreement and the February 25, 1989 settlement agreement. Those contracts 
contemplated an arrangement with WHWC to issue water stock to the lot owners to protect 
their interests and to SIDCO and Eaglebrook, as the subdivision developers, to protect 
their interests. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that under those contracts 
Eaglebrook's sole right in the one-third share of SIDCO's water distribution system was to 
hold it until transfered to WHWC for the development of subdivision lots. T. 637. The trial 
court's ruling was more akin to the imposition of resulting trust than a constructive trust in 
that the essential element of a resulting trust is the finding of an intent that property be 
held for the benefit of another. Baker v. Patte. 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984). Constructive 
trusts generally are not based upon an intention of the parties. Parks v. Zions First 
National Bank. 673 P. 2d 590 (Utah). 
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The trial court's basis for imposing the trust on Eaglebrook arose out of the 
contractual plan devised by the Winchester Hills Subdivision developers, Tolman and 
Walter, to eventually transfer all of SIDCO's water distribution system to WHWC. The trial 
court did not deem it necessary, nor did WHWC request, that the January 19 and February 
25,1989 agreements be invalidated because the division of the water distribution system 
could be argued to be a breach of the developers' fiduciary duties to WHWC. Indeed, 
WHWC's counsel conceded in argument on the directed verdicts at the close of all the 
evidence that, "I guess what I'm saying, Your Honor, is we [WHWC] would like a 
constructive trust imposed on that property [Eaglebrook's one-third interest in the Water 
Agreement.]" T. 787. 
The trial court ordered the equitable relief WHWC had requested against Lava 
Bluff, that is, that it be required to return the one-third interest in the water distribution 
system it had received from Eaglebrook. Then, in imposing a constructive trust on 
Eaglebrook's bare legal title to that property, it effectuated the intent of SIDCO, Eaglebrook 
and WHWC, as expressed in the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement. That agreement 
had been made for WHWC's benefit and was subsequently acknowledged by WHWC's 
member-officers as being binding upon the water company. Under these circumstances 
it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering Eaglebrook to 
convey the one-third interest to WHWC at the present time. 
The terms of the January 19th Water Agreement state the circumstances under 
which Eaglebrook can use its one-third share of the water distribution system, and by 
virtue of the trial court's imposition of the trust Eaglebrook is prohibited from doing 
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anything else with that property. Indeed, WHWC has proceeded with the other developer, 
SIDCO, in the development of additional subdivision phase lots by accepting the 
conveyance of SIDCO's one-third interest in the water distribution SIDCO obtained under 
the February 25, 1989 settlement agreement. This agreement with SIDCO was the July 
24, 1991 agreement. Ex. P-26. A future agreement with similar purposes can be 
contemplated. 
So, although the trial court might have described the trust it imposed on Eaglebrook 
as a resulting trust, rather than a constructive trust, the important factor for this Court's 
consideration of WHWC's appeal is that the legitimate interests of both parties, 
Eaglebrook and WHWC, have been protected by the trust terms as imposed by the trial 
court. 
WHWC is simply wrong in alleging the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 
impose trust terms that were "remedial" and that "answered the demands of equity." The 
trial court remedied the equitable wrong it found by ordering Lava Bluff to return title to 
Eaglebrook, and it answered the demands of equity by preserving the legitimate interests 
of both WHWC and Eaglebrook-interests which WHWC had acknowledged, ratified and 
enjoyed via its dealings with the developers, SIDCO and Eaglebrook, subsequent to the 
election of the independent WHWC board of trustees in May 1989. 
Eaglebrook does not appeal the trial court's imposition of the constructive trust. 
Eaglebrook can live with its obligations under the January 19, 1989 Water Agreement. 
However, Eaglebrook has the right to expect that WHWC will honor its contractual 
obligations under that agreement which were made in furtherance of the February 25, 
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1988 settlement agreement. Eaglebrook gave valid and legal consideration for that 
agreement. The trust remedy imposed by the trial court makes this reciprocal honoring of 
contractual obligations by WHWC and Eaglebrook possible. Under these circumstances, 
Eaglebrook enjoys no unjust enrichment, and it has every valid reason to retain the bare 
legal title to the one-third share of the water distribution system. The trial court's order 
effectively protects the interests of WHWC's shareholders. The order also negates the 
litany of "problems" suggested by WHWC as reasons for requesting that Eaglebrook's 
one-third title be returned to the water company at this time. 
CONCLUSION IN RESPONSE 
The trial court's directed verdict ruling that Cross-Appellee Tolman is not obligated 
to convey 25 acre feet of water to WHWC should be upheld. That ruling is supported by 
the overwhelming weight of the undisputed evidence and the inferences which could be 
drawn therefrom even when viewed in a light most favorable to Cross-Appellant WHWC. 
Likewise, this Court should uphold the constructive trust terms imposed upon Cross-
Appellee Eaglebrook regarding its continuing to hold bare legal title to the one-third 
interest in WHWC's water distribution system, that is, in harmony with the January 19, 
1989 Water Agreement. Cross-Appellant WHWC has not shown that the trial court 
abused its discretion in fashioning this equitable remedy, particularly when viewed in the 
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context of the trial court's application of the meaning of the unambiguous agreements of 
January 19 and February 25, 1989. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ( ^ > day of August 1995. 
CLYDE^SNDW & SWENSON, P.C. 
UAOiaiak A. y{i^^J 
Susannah E. Kesler 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Tolman 
and Cross-Appellees Tolman, 
Eaglebrook Corp. and Lava Bluff 
Water Company, Inc. 
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38 
799 
THE COURT: Mr, Dunn? 
MR, DUNN: Yes, 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DUNN: The exceptions that I have relate to 
the special — first of all, to the special verdict form. 
I do not believe that the law is adequate or requires a — 
or enables a jury to award attorney's fees in any way in 
this particular case. And based on that, the special 
verdict of the jury form, items seven and eight, are 
improperly included. 
I object to the instructions in the — in the — 
the instructions themselves that relate to those particular 
issues — specifically any instruction that deals with 
fiduciary responsibility — because the only damage that 
can be claimed is the attorney's fees. I do not believe 
fiduciary responsibility or breach of fiduciary 
responsibility should be included to the jury, and 
therefore, based on that, I would except — take exception 
to Instruction No. 13, No. 14, No. 15, No. 16. Again, it 
centers around the — even taking the issues of damages 
being attorney's fees. And for that purpose, I would 
except those particular items. 
THE COURT: All right. And just so the record 
is clear, we had discussed Mr. Dunn's exceptions prior to 
going on the record. The Court is relying on the case of 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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South Sanpitch Company versus Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, for the 
proposition that if there was a breach of fiduciary duty, 
attorney's fees incurred in litigation with third parties 
to correct the effects of that breach may be assessed as 
damages by the — by the jury. And that's the reason for 
the inclusion of those instructions and those provisions in 
the special verdict form. 
MR. DUNN: And it's my position — or the 
position of the plaintiffs — that the interpretation 
applied by the Court to South Sanpitch is wrong. 
MR. WILCOX: I think that the — the statement 
that the jury should decide the — whether fees are 
appropriate, and the Court will later decide the amount of 
fees under reasonable standards — under the reasonableness 
standard — I think that's an accurate statement. 
THE COURT: All right. And that, of course, has 
been stipulated to, that if we are going to assess 
attorney's fees, the reasonable amount will be determined 
at a later date by the Court; is that correct? 
MR. DUNN: That's right. And, of course, that 
stipulation is subject to the objection and exception. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
Okay. Let's go out, and we'll begin court 
without the jury present for a brief motion, and then we'll 
have the jury join us, and we'll proceed from there. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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